He is author, coauthor, or editor of 34 books and almost peer reviewed articles. The political psychology contributions draw on richer, ancient Greek understandings of the psyche and offer novel insights into strategies of conflict management, the role of emotions in international relations, and the modern fixation on identity.
Keith Payne, former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and an unparalleled bipartisan group of senior civilian and military experts critically examine eight basic assumptions of Minimum Deterrence against available evidence. In general, Minimum Deterrence does not fare well under the careful scrutiny. Proponents of a "Minimum Deterrent" US nuclear force posture believe that anywhere from a handful to a few hundred nuclear weapons are adequate to deter reliably and predictably any enemy from attacking the United States now and in the future.
Because nuclear weapons are so destructive, their thinking goes, no foreign leader would dare challenge US capabilities. The benefits, advocates claim, of reducing US nuclear weapons to the "minimum" level needed are: better relations with Russia and China, reinforcement of the arms control and Nonproliferation Treaty, billions of defense dollars in savings, and greater international stability on the way to "nuclear zero. This book was published as a special issue of Comparative Strategy.
These include sanction risk perceptions and their behavioral consequences, the deterrent efficacy of the certainty versus the severity of punishment, the role of celerity of punishment in the deterrence process, informal versus formal deterrence, and individual differences in deterrence. The richness of the volume is seen in the inclusion of chapters that focus on the theoretical development of deterrence across disciplines such as criminology and economics.
In an innovative section, the role of agents of deterrence is considered. Can you help donate a copy? When you buy books using these links the Internet Archive may earn a small commission. Open Library is a project of the Internet Archive , a c 3 non-profit. This edition doesn't have a description yet. Can you add one? Add another edition? Psychology and deterrence Robert Jervis. Donate this book to the Internet Archive library. If you own this book, you can mail it to our address below.
Want to Read. Delete Note Save Note. Check nearby libraries Library. For example, the desire to conserve cognitive resources can cause decision-makers to look at misleading indicators of military strength, and psychological pressures can lead them to run particularly high risks. The book also looks at how deterrent threats and counterpart promises often fail because they are misperceived. How Statesmen Think examines how these processes play out in many situations that arise in foreign and security policy, including the threat of inadvertent war, the development of domino beliefs, the formation and role of national identities, and conflicts between intelligence organizations and policymakers.
Schneider explores this "abiding faith" in her volume, overviewing past assumptions that punishment or merely the threat of punishment necessarily deters criminal behavior. She critically examines specific deterrence theories and presents the methodology used in her own research - research whose findings are often quite disruptive to those assumptions held so long. Using data from six experimental studies in U. Beyond these results, the author raises some pointed issues to explain why perceptions of certainty and severity of punishment generally perform so inadequately in predicting subsequent offenses.
A comparison between incarceration methods and community-based restitution programs, as well as the implications of policy, comprise a thorough discussion which focuses on the future and reflects upon the role of random experiments regarding issues of public policy initiatives.
International relations theory urgently needs strategies for coping with the growing complexity of the international system following the collapse of the US—Soviet bipolar stalemate, the multiple challenges to US unipolar hegemony, and the rise of powerful non-Western actors. Over the course of this book, leading scholars of international relations and diplomatic history return to an approach to explanation pioneered in the writings of Robert Jervis.
The approach calls for nesting multiple layers of explanation--systemic, strategic, and perceptual--in an integrated causal account that is simultaneously parsimonious and nuanced.
Highlighting the logic of strategic interactions under uncertainty, it also integrates the effects of psychological biases and the unintended consequences of acting in complex systems to provide explanations that are at once theoretically rigorous and rich in empirical detail.
Analyzing the current state of Realist theory, signaling under conditions of uncertainty and anarchy, the role of nuclear weapons in international politics, the role of cognition and emotions in economic and foreign policy decision making, and questions of responsibility in international affairs, the authors provide a compelling guide for the future of international relations theory.
This book will be of much interest to students of international relations, foreign policy, and security studies. Score: 5.
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